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~~SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION~~

No. 12-15893

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

JONATHAN CORBETT,
Petitioner,

v.

TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION,
Respondent.

On Petition For Review Of An Order Of
The Transportation Security Administration

ADMINISTRATIVE RECORD — SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION
MATERIALS (VOLUME 4D)

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140	002246	TSA Security Screening Checkpoint Standard Operating Procedures, Revision 8.	May 28, 2008
141	002263	TSA Procurement Specification for Whole Body Imager Devices for Checkpoint Operations, Version 1.02.	September 23, 2008
142	002333	Whole Body Imager Standard Operating Procedures issued by TSA.	June 1, 2009
143	002363	TSA brief to the Homeland Security Council titled "Imaging Technology Program."	August 7, 2009
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145	002402	TSA "Systems Planning and Evaluation: Concept of Operations, Advanced Imaging Technology Systems" document.	September 2, 2009
146	002417	Excerpts from DHS Acquisition Review Board Presentation for Passenger Screening Program.	September 8, 2009

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151	002649	Description of Pat-down procedures under consideration.	January 1, 2010
152	002651	Pat-down Working Group Depiction of Proposed Pat-down Options following Flight 253 Attempt.	January 1, 2010

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156	002682	DHS TSL Quick Look Report for Rapiscan AIT, regarding Verification of Upgrade to Software Version 03.04.01.	February 18, 2010
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158	002700	TSA Procurement Specification for Advanced Imaging Technology (AIT) for Checkpoint Operations, version 2.11.	March 4, 2010
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168	003055	TSA Office of Intelligence's Civil Aviation Threat Assessment 2010. (This document is also marked For Official Use Only)	June 1, 2010
169	003074	Action Memo regarding Sensitive Area Private Searches.	June 2, 2010
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171	003138	TSA Office of Security Technology, Statement of Work for AIT-ATR for Checkpoint Operations.	June 21, 2010
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199	004407	Final ATR Operational Testing & Evaluation Period Weekly Data Report re Frequency of Additional Screening from AIT.	March 22, 2011
200	004408	Presentation of AIT Incidents & Finds, January-March 2011.	April 2011

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Volume 4D

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202	004656	DHS Science & Technology Directorate, Transportation Security Lab (TSL) Final Report, Lab Qualification Test, L3 ProVision 100 -- Advanced Imaging Technology with Automatic Target Recognition (AIT-ATR).	May 9, 2011
203	004680	Action Memo re Threat Testing During QT&E for L3 AIT-ATR.	June 6, 2011
204	004681	Action Memo re Remedying Deficiencies in L3 AIT-ATR.	June 7, 2011
205	004682	DHS Acquisition Review Board Presentation -- Automated Target Recognition.	June 13, 2011
206	004723	DHS DOT&E Letter of Assessment re AIT- ATR Follow-on Operational Test & Evaluation. (This document also appears to be proprietary.)	June 22, 2011
207	004737	Advanced Imaging Technology - Automated Target Recognition Briefing.	July 2011
208	004755	Standard Operating Procedures for AIT with ATR.	July 13, 2011
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211	004944	Action Memo re Criteria for Inclusion in Fall 2011 RBS Pilot	September 30, 2011
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213	005094	Standard Operating Procedures for Risk-Based Security (RBS) TSA PreCheck	February 15, 2013

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216	005119	TSA Screening Checkpoint Standard Operating Procedures, Revision 9, Change 5.	July 9, 2012
217	005264	Information Memo re Managed Inclusion Proof of Concept Underway	December 14, 2012
218	005269	Action Memo re Approval to Adjust Managed Inclusion Procedures	January 18, 2013
219	005278	Action Memo re Rapiscan Retirements	January 21, 2013
220	005283	L3 AIT-ATR Qualification Data Package. (This document also appears to be proprietary.)	undated

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217	005264	Information Memo re Managed Inclusion Proof of Concept Underway	December 14, 2012
218	005269	Action Memo re Approval to Adjust Managed Inclusion Procedures	January 18, 2013
219	005278	Action Memo re RapiScan Rollouts	January 21, 2013
220	005283	L3 AIT-ATR Qualification Data Package (This document also appears to be proprietary.)	undated

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
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Transportation Security Administration

SYSTEM EVALUATION REPORT



L3 ProVision

**Advanced Imaging Technology (AIT) System
Automatic Target Recognition (ATR)**

May 6, 2011

OFFICE OF SECURITY TECHNOLOGY

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
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SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

Administration Security Transportation



SYSTEM EVALUATION REPORT



L3 Provision

Pages 004598-004655 of the Administrative Record have been redacted in full.

Automatic Target Recognition (ATR)

May 6, 2011

OFFICE OF SECURITY TECHNOLOGY

1. This report contains information that is exempt from release under the Freedom of Information Act (5 U.S.C. 552) because it is classified as Sensitive Security Information (SSI) under the Department of Homeland Security's SSI Policy (DHS Policy 100-100). This information is being released to you under a limited exception to the SSI Policy. This information is being released to you under a limited exception to the SSI Policy. This information is being released to you under a limited exception to the SSI Policy.

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**Final Report,
Lab Qualification Test,
L-3 ProVision 100, v3.8.13/14**

**Advanced Imaging
Technology with Automatic
Target Recognition (AIT-ATR)**

May 9, 2011

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U.S. Department of Homeland Security
Science and Technology Directorate

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AR 004656

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SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

Final Report,
Lab Qualification Test,
L-3 Provision 100, v3.8.1314
Advanced Imaging
Technology with Automatic
Target Recognition (AIT-ATR)



Pages 004657-004679 of the Administrative Record have been redacted in full.

May 8, 2011

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U.S. Department of Homeland Security
Science and Technology Directorate

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SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

U.S. Department of Homeland Security
Arlington, VA 22202



Transportation
Security
Administration

June 6, 2011

ACTION MEMO

MEMORANDUM FOR: Scot Thaxton
Assistant General Manager
Office of Security Operations (OSO)

FROM: Jason Martin *JM 6/9/11*
Program Manager PSP
Office of Security Technology (OST)

SUBJECT: Concurrence on the Qualification Testing and Evaluation (QT&E) for
the Advanced Imaging Technology (AIT) with Automatic Target
Recognition (ATR) by the User Community

Purpose

This memo is to gain concurrence from the Office of Security Operations (OSO) that the [REDACTED] means of conveyance (i.e. personnel, locations) employed during QT&E represented the threat space for AIT Tier I with ATR, as defined under the *Imaging Technology for Checkpoint Screening Operations Detection Standard*, Version 3.3, dated 28 October 2010.

Discussion

The data source for assessing the detection Key Performance Parameters (KPP) primarily relies on the QT&E conducted by the Transportation Security Laboratory (TSL). The user community is vital in providing feedback into the threat challenge matrix that is employed by the TSL to verify satisfaction of the detection KPP requirements.

Recommendation

OSO concurs that the [REDACTED] means of conveyance employed during QT&E adequately spanned and represented the relevant threat space for AIT Tier I w/ ATR, as defined under the *Imaging Technology for Checkpoint Screening Operations Detection Standard*, Version 3.3, dated 28 October 2010.

Approved: *Karen Falty for Scot Thaxton* Disapproved: _____

Requires More Discussion: _____

Date: *6/9/11*

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SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

U.S. Department of Homeland Security
Arlington, VA 22202

JUN 7 2011



Transportation
Security
Administration

ACTION MEMO

MEMORANDUM FOR: Scot Thaxton
Assistant General Manager
Office of Security Operations (OSO)

FROM: Jason Martin *JM*
Program Manager PSP
Office of Security Technology (OST)

SUBJECT: Deficient Requirements from Qualification Testing of the L-3
Advanced Imaging Technology (AIT) with Automated Target
Recognition (ATR)

Purpose

This memo documents the deficiencies found as a result of the qualification testing of the L-3 Provision Advanced Imaging Technology (AIT) system with Automated Target Recognition (ATR).

Discussion

There were [REDACTED] deficiencies noted by the Transportation Security Laboratory (TSL) during the qualification testing. These deficiencies, outlined below, were from the *Functional Requirements Document for an Advanced Imaging Technology System with Automatic Target Recognition for Checkpoint Operations*, Version 1.2, dated September 9, 2010, and the *Procurement Specification for the Advanced Imaging Technology (AIT) for Checkpoint Operations*, Version 2.11, dated March 4, 2010. Prior to all upgrades and deployment of ATR, L-3 will complete [REDACTED] L-3 is currently in the process of resolving the other [REDACTED] deficiencies.

Recommendation

OST has worked with the Office of Acquisition/Contracting Officer for the L-3 AIT production contract to develop a plan of action and milestones from L-3 regarding the resolution of these deferred requirements. L-3 will have [REDACTED] prior to fleet deployment of the ATR. The resolution of the other [REDACTED] deficiencies will be resolved by June 30, 2011, and will be incorporated in their next software revision.

Approved: *Alberto Sanchez* Disapproved: _____

Requires More Discussion: _____ Date: _____

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SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

DHS Acquisition Review Board

Automated Target Recognition TSA Office of Security Technology

Jason Martin, Program Manager
Domenic Bianchini, General Manager

June 13th, 2011

Standard Deck V.7



Homeland
Security

SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

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ARB Decisions and Issues

- Acquisition Decisions Requested

- (1) Approval for Automatic Target Recognition (ATR) software upgrade to enhance threat detection capabilities and passenger throughput of existing L3 Tier 1 Advanced Imaging Technology systems
- (2) Delegation for the future Rapiscan ATR upgrade procurement decision to the CAE based on concurrence of test program and results from DOT&E
- (3) Delegation of future LRIP and FRP procurement decisions to the CAE based on alignment to APB estimates, concurrence of test program, and results from DOT&E. LRIP strategy will be pursued to accelerate vendor development efforts and minimize investment risk by providing additional time for operational testing and evaluation.

- Document Approval Requested

- Life Cycle Cost Estimate
- Integrated Logistics Support Plan
- Acquisition Program Baseline
- Operational Requirements Document for AT-2
- Operational Requirements Document for AIT with ATR

- Issues

- Vendor Development of ATR solutions
- AIT Funding levels are in question for the future procurement of AIT units



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Primary Benefits of ATR

- Provides consistent performance through automated image interpretation
- Drastically reduces training costs, duration and resource demands by eliminating the need to train operators to interpret passenger images
- [REDACTED]
- Actual image of passengers will not be displayed to Imaging Officer alleviating privacy concerns
- [REDACTED]
- Significant FTE savings in elimination of Image Operator (IO) position
- Eliminates cost and space requirements associated with additional infrastructure (IO room)



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Approval of ATR update to L3 units

ATR Key Performance Parameters

KPP	Result Identified in System Evaluation Report
Detection: Detection Rate During TSL Testing (ORD #33/KPP)	[REDACTED]
Detection: Detection Rate During OT (ORD #33/KPP)	[REDACTED]
Throughput: Passengers Screened per Hour (ORD #34/KPP)	[REDACTED]
Operational Availability: (AO) (ORD #22/KPP)	The L3 AIT/ATR met the requirement [REDACTED] the fact that the L3 AIT/ATR did not require any scheduled preventive maintenance were key contributors to the overall AO result.
Safety: HSI SME Assessment of Safety (ORD #25/KPP #26)	[REDACTED]

The reliability of the system and




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
AIT ATR Effectiveness



Reliability – Operational Availability

Airport	Total Test Hours	Total Downtime Hours	A ₀
ATL	558.3	13.9	
DCA	566.8	1.5	
LAS	563.5	2.9	
Overall	1688.6	18.3	

Throughput - Passengers Per Hour



Passengers Per Hour

of Occurrences



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AIT ATR Effectiveness (Continued)

- [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED]
- OT&E ATR achieved average hourly throughput [REDACTED] passengers per hour. (requirement [REDACTED] – current average [REDACTED])
- Operational availability (A°) [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED]
- System was proven to not interfere with other security equipment



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
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ATR Requirement Deferrals



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AR 004688

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Status of ATR Requirement Deferrals

- OST has worked with the Office of Acquisition/Contracting Officer for the L-3 AIT production contract to develop a plan of action and milestones from L-3 regarding the resolution of [REDACTED] deferred requirements.
 - For the Operational Test Kit (OTK) requirement, L3 will have an approved OTK prior to fleet deployment of the ATR solution.
 - L3 will provide a resolution for the other 10 deficiencies by June 30, 2011 which will be incorporated into their next software revision.



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Near Term ATR Testing Excursions

- In order to improve the effectiveness and efficiency on the current ATR capability, OST will execute a test excursion in July to test the ATR and the Screening Operator (SO) at 3 original OT&E locations: ATL, DCA and LAS
- The test excursion will gather data on:
 - Detection capabilities for Tier I, Tier II and Tier III threats for ATR and the SO
 - Secondary search rate associated with the ATR system



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DOT&E Letter of Assessment

Conclusions

Testing conducted according to DHS DOT&E approved TEMP and OTP

All approved COICs were covered for approved performance metrics

Testing included robust variety of prohibited items

Text from LOA

"The Operational Test Agent conducted operational testing as described in the approved Test and Evaluation Master Plan (TEMP) and Operational Test Plan (OTP)."

"The FOT&E spanned the scope of the approved Critical Operational Issues and Criteria (COIC), with emphasis on performance metrics likely to be affected through implementing the ATR modification on existing L3 AIT units."

"Qualification testing at the TSL was conducted against a robust variety of prohibited items and demonstrated system detection performance IAW KPP and ORD requirements."



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DOT&E Letter of Assessment con't

Additional Comments

TSA rebuttal

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] calls into question the overall impact on manpower associated with potential deployment of the ATR."

[REDACTED] the duration of the pat down by the SO was 10 seconds less than the average pat down time associated with an IO system.



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DOT&E Letter of Assessment con't

Recommendations

Additional targeted test excursions

"...resource and implement targeted test excursions

System calibration assessment

"Assess the extent to which system calibration procedures in general (including use of vendor-supplied tools) result in a consistent and acceptable level of system performance."

Field Data Reporting System assessment

"assess the adequacy of field data reporting system information with respect to stakeholder requirements, and objectively and quantitatively determine the accuracy and precision of this information."

More rigorous analysis of effects of ATR on manpower requirements and achieved throughput

"Conduct a more rigorous analysis of the operational impact of system deployment with ATR enabled on overall checkpoint manpower requirements and achieved throughput."



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Approval of new AIT Acquisition Strategy

Present Acquisition Strategy: Current Rolling, Open Qualified Products List does not provide TSA the flexibility to incorporate development work with the vendors, which is necessary to arrive at a reduced size AIT unit and incorporate other functionalities (Shoe Scanner, Cast & Prosthesis Imager, STIP) into the system, as well as allow TSA to require ATR before accepting systems for test

Acquisition Strategy: Developmental LRIP approach with separate awards for full size and reduced size AIT w/ATR

Contract Type: Schedule C Contracts with multiple options

Benefits:

- Will allow TSA to further develop AITs in a spiral approach
- Allows for TSA to integrate with other forms of technology (Ex: STIP, Shoe Scanner)




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
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Program Schedule



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Issues

- Vendor Development of ATR Solutions
 - L3 has developed and successfully tested an ATR solution
 - [REDACTED]
- AIT Funding levels are in question for the future procurement of AIT units
 - The amount of funding provided by congress for AIT is uncertain.



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Risk Summary

#	Risk	Description
1		If it is determined that funding will not be allocated for an AIT procurement in the next fiscal year, TSA will not meet its previously stated goal of deploying 1275 units by December 2012.
2	FY12 Funding	If vendors are unable to develop a Reduced Size AIT unit with ATR and 7 second processing time, TSA may not meet desired deployment levels or achieve desired level of threat mitigation.
3	Reduced Size AIT with ATR	
4	Legislation relating to Backscatter Technology	If Congress enacts legislation restricting the use of x-ray based AIT systems, this may hinder or delay future deployment and or procurement schedules for AIT.

Risk Matrix

Severity of Consequence					Probability of Occurrence				
Unacceptable					Remote	Unlikely	Likely	Highly Likely	Near Certainty
Critical	3		1						
Significant				2, 4					
Marginal									
Minimal or no Impact									



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Risk Mitigation

#	Risk	Description/Impact	Mitigation Strategy
1			
2	FY12 Funding	If it is determined that funding will not be allocated for an AIT procurement in the next fiscal year, TSA will not meet its previously stated goal of deploying 1275 units by December 2012.	Coordinate with the TSA Office of Legislative Affairs to develop appropriate messaging for this area.
3	Reduced Size AIT with ATR	If vendors are unable to develop a Reduced Size AIT unit with ATR and 7 second processing time, TSA may not meet desired deployment levels or achieve desired threat mitigation and detection capabilities.	TSA's LRIP strategy, which incorporates development activities with the vendors, will facilitate vendors ability to deliver a reduced size unit that meets TSA's operational requirements.
4	Legislation relating to Backscatter Technology	If Congress enacts legislation restricting the use of x-ray based AIT systems, this may hinder or delay future deployment and or procurement schedules for AIT.	Coordinate with the TSA Offices of Legislative Affairs and Finance to develop appropriate responses to these actions.



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Open ADM Action Items

- **Action:** Provide a briefing on the RMA Philosophy, Planning and Implementation. The PSP Program Office is to provide a briefing for ARB members that describes the Program's RMA philosophy, process and implementation plan.

- **Response:** An RMA approach has been developed and submitted to DHS. Verbal concurrence has been received and formal approval is expected.

- **Action:** Revise and update the APB, LCCE, and ILSP. The PSP Program Office is to update their APB, LCCE, and ILSP to address upgrades/technology refreshment, recapitalization and the requirements to support the program's RMA concept, with a specific recapitalization and the requirements to support the program's RMA concept, with a specific look towards leveling macro-expenditure rates to manage spending spikes.

- **Response:** The APB was forwarded by APMSD on 6/8 to the CAE for signature. Feedback for the LCCE was received from DHS/CAD on 6/3 and a meeting was held on 6/9 to review DHS comments & mitigation strategies. The ILSP is at DHS for coordination as of 6/8.

- **Action:** Provide input/insight for developing DHS wide policy on use and maintenance of QPL. TSA is to provide input for QPL development and use to the APMD.

- **Response:** A QPL presentation has been drafted and is currently being reviewed and updated within APMSD.

- **Action:** Update the Operational Requirements Document and Test and Evaluation Master Plan (TEMP). The program office is to update the AT-2 APB, ORD, and TEMP to convey parameters and schedule for follow-on testing of AT-2 screening machines. This update is to be completed prior to the start of testing that will support any additional AT-2 procurements, and will be documented using an ADM signed by the DHS Chief Procurement Officer.

- **Response:** AT-2 ORD delivered to APMSD on 6/1 and is currently under review. The AT-2 TEMP is under development and will be circulated for approval after the ORD is signed.



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ARB Summary

Acquisition Decisions Requested

- (1) Approval for Automatic Target Recognition (ATR) software upgrade to enhance threat detection capabilities and passenger throughput of existing L3 Advanced Imaging Technology systems
- (2) Delegation for the future Rapiscan ATR upgrade procurement decision to the CAE based on concurrence of test program and results from DOT&E
- (3) Delegation of future LRIP and FRP procurement decisions to the CAE based on alignment to APB estimates, concurrence of test program, and results from DOT&E. LRIP strategy will be pursued to accelerate vendor development efforts and minimize investment risk by providing additional time for operational testing and evaluation.

Document Approval Requested

- Life Cycle Cost Estimate
- Integrated Logistics Support Plan
- Acquisition Program Baseline
- Operational Requirements Document for AT-2
- Operational Requirements Document for AIT with ATR

Issues

- Vendor Development of ATR solutions
- AIT Funding levels are in question for the future procurement of AIT units

Next Steps

- Implement new ATR-equipped AIT Acquisition Strategy with LRIP and FRP procurements to reach FOC
- Seek continuous enhancements to AIT/ATR with DOT&E review of system changes when appropriate



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Backup Slides



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Program Quad Chart

Program

The mission need focuses on airport passenger screening checkpoints where people and carry-on items are screened for dangerous items. Each time a new threat is identified, the requirements for screening the stream-of-commerce that passes through the checkpoint changes. This makes deployment of threat detection devices largely reactive, and until an effective solution can be deployed, the passenger screening process relies on manual methods for detection of the new threat. This impedes the flight embarkation process and frustrates passengers.

Project Summary

The following technologies are being procured using a mixed lifecycle approach:

- Advanced Imaging Technology (AIT)
- Automated Wait Times (AWT)*
- Advanced Technology 2 (AT2)
- Bottled Liquid Scanner 2 (BLS2)
- Credential Authentication Technology / Boarding Pass Scanning System (CAT/BPSS)
- Next Gen ETD (Desktop and Portable)
- Shoe Scanner Device (SSD)
- Chemical Analysis Device (CAD)**
- Cast and Prosthesis Imager (CPI)

Program Description

The Passenger Screening Program (PSP) focuses on identifying, field testing, procuring, deploying, and sustaining equipment that detects explosives and/or prohibited items that may be concealed on people and/or their carry-on items. This is accomplished by procuring and deploying a mixed lifecycle of technologies. Throughout the lifecycle of the program, PSP's four primary goals are to:

- Increase threat detection capability
- Improve passenger screening efficiency
- Promote a positive passenger experience
- Balance privacy and security

Benefits

PSP supports the prevention of terrorist and criminal acts in the aviation transportation environment. The program's activities are designed to support screening activities that minimize the risk of personal injury or death, or damage to or loss of property, due to acts of terrorism or criminal activity directed toward aviation transportation.

* Not recommended for oversight because AWT is not a security technology.

** Not recommended for oversight because the product is a COTS solution and the contract is a low dollar value.



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PSP Overview

The Passenger Screening Program (PSP) focuses on identifying, field testing, procuring, deploying, and sustaining equipment that detects explosives and/or prohibited items that may be concealed on people and/or their carry-on items. PSP's four primary goals are:

Enhance and Automate Threat Detection

Integrate Technology and Processes

Promoting a positive passenger experience

Enhance Collaboration with Stakeholders

PSP Initiatives

People Screening

Provides technical capability to allow Transportation Security Officers (TSO) to detect threats carried by passengers including explosives, weapons, and other prohibited items.
- AIT, CPI, EMD, SSD

Carry-On Baggage

Provides technical capability to allow TSOs to detect threats on or concealed in the passenger's carry-on baggage including explosives, weapons, and other prohibited items. - AT, BLS, ETD, CAD

Layered Security

Provides additional layers of capabilities outside of the checkpoint to create an enterprise security solution. Integrates passenger and baggage screening and provides technology capabilities beyond the checkpoint.
- AWT, CAT/BPSS, ELBC

Primary Users of PSP Technologies: Transportation Security Officers and Transportation Security Specialists-Explosives / Office of Security Operations.

Dependent Upon: User to provide mature requirements, Equipment Manufacturers to achieve desired capabilities, testing laboratories to qualify technologies, Office of Acquisition to award contracts.



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Program Structure

Project Name	Description	Cost (\$M)	FOC Quantity	Acquisition Type	Acquisition Vehicle	Acquisition Life Cycle			ARB Status
						NEED	ANALYZE SELECT	OBTAIN	
AIT	Advanced Imaging Technology	\$331.7M	1800	IDIQ	Material				Jun. 2011 (DHS ART)
AT2 (tier 2)	Advanced Technology, next generation	\$281.7M	2325	IDIQ	Material				Mar. 2012 (TSA/DHS)
AWT	Automated Wait Time (AWT)	\$23.5M	470	IDIQ	Material			★	Sept. 2011 (TSA)
BLS2	Bottled Liquid Scanner, next generation	\$44.1M	1500	IDIQ	Material				Sept. 2009 (TSA/DHS)
CAT/BPSS	Credential Authentication Technology / Boarding Pass Scanning System	\$36.4M	1300	IDIQ	Material			★	Sept. 2011 (TSA/DHS)
ETD Recap (Next Gen)	Explosives Trace Detector - next generation	\$44.0M	2500	IDIQ	Material				FY08 ARB
ETD (Portable)	Explosives Trace Detector - next generation - ARRA	\$39.2M	811	IDIQ	Material			★	Mar. 2012 (TSA/DHS)
SSD	Shoe Scanner Detection, next generation	\$186.0m	2325	IDIQ	Material			★	Jun. 2012 (TSA/DHS)
CAD	Chemical Analysis Device	\$12.5M	255	IDIQ	Material				N/A
CPI	Cast and Prosthesis Imager	\$1.8M	35	IDIQ	Material				N/A



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Funding Profile

Funding Profile vs. LCCE (in TY\$(K))									
FY 2010 & Prior*	FY 2011	FY 2012	FY 2013	FY 2014	FY 2015	FY 2016	FY 2017	FY 2018 & Beyond	Total
Available Carry Over	\$132,693	\$	\$	\$	\$	\$	\$	\$	\$ 132,693
FYHSP/CIP ¹	\$1,177,565	\$318,434	\$229,884	\$273,448	\$273,316	\$271,862	\$ 269,971	\$ 2,027,793	\$ 5,159,071
All Other Funding ²	\$ 301,118	\$	\$	\$	\$	\$	\$	\$	\$ 301,118
Total Funding ³	\$1,478,683	\$318,434	\$229,884	\$273,448	\$273,316	\$271,862	\$ 269,971	\$ 2,027,793	\$ 5,592,882
Planning	\$9,260	\$6,450	\$1,130	\$1,520	\$860	\$8,910	\$4,840	\$53,679	\$ 87,979
Acquisition	\$389,900	\$265,250	\$199,290	\$193,580	\$87,120	\$185,560	\$358,804	\$3,392,367	\$ 5,237,611
Operations and Maintenance	\$182,810	\$86,240	\$93,550	\$98,140	\$115,070	\$121,670	\$117,177	\$1,744,065	\$ 2,662,512
Total LCCE ⁴	\$ 581,970	\$357,940	\$293,970	\$270,860	\$203,050	\$316,140	\$ 480,821	\$ 5,190,111	\$ 7,988,102
Surplus/(Deficit) ⁵		\$91,551	\$24,464	\$63,356	\$2,588	\$70,266	(\$210,850)	(\$3,162,318)	(\$3,291,933)
Actual Costs	\$1,255,815	\$ 18,491							\$ 1,274,306
Existing O&M									

¹ Funding line is FY13-17 CIP, approved 4-6-11.

² All Other Funding reflects all sources of funding not included in the FYHSP/CIP line (Includes: ARRA, FY07 supplemental, and prior year recoveries).

³ CIP funding represents FY03-FY24

⁴ LCCE is in draft and represents FY09-FY29 costs, it is based on unconstrained requirements and may change to smooth costs.

⁵ Surplus/Deficit equals Total Funding minus Total LCCE



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Slide 5

AR 004705

Funding Execution Status

Execution Status (in \$K) ¹											
	A	B	C	D	E		UN _{add} = (E _{add} /E _{add})*100				
					E = A + B + C + D		UN _{exp} = (E _{exp} /E _{exp})*100				
	FY-2005	FY-2008	FY-2010	FY 2011	Total		Un-Expended Carryover from		A, B, C, & D		
	CY-6	CY-3	CY-1	(CY)							
Checkpoint Support (2-Year)											
Budget Authority (BA) ²	\$ -	\$ -	\$ 89,640	\$ 313,882	\$ 403,522						
Obligations (Obl)	\$ -	\$ -	\$ 33,513	\$ 18,472	\$ 51,985		\$ 351,537			87%	
Expenditures (Exp)	\$ -	\$ -	\$ 7,016	\$ 373	\$ 7,389		\$ 396,133			98%	
Prior Year Recoveries (No Year)											
Budget Authority (BA) ²	\$ 10,798	\$ 25,483	\$ -	\$ -	\$ 36,281						
Obligations (Obl)	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -		\$ 36,281			100%	
Expenditures (Exp)	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -		\$ 36,281			100%	
Security Technology Maintenance (2-Year)											
Budget Authority (BA) ²	\$ -	\$ -	\$ 1,925	\$ 75,860	\$ 77,785						
Obligations (Obl)	\$ -	\$ -	\$ 1,920	\$ 59,622	\$ 61,542		\$ 16,243			21%	
Expenditures (Exp)	\$ -	\$ -	\$ 394	\$ 8,990	\$ 9,384		\$ 68,401			88%	
Operational Integration (2-Year)											
Budget Authority (BA) ²	\$ -	\$ -	\$ 4,847	\$ 12,387	\$ 17,234						
Obligations (Obl)	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -		\$ 17,234			100%	
Expenditures (Exp)	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -		\$ 17,234			100%	

¹ Funds shown represent all available funds for execution in the FY2011.

² Budget authority only includes the amount of funds allocated to the Passenger Screening Program.

- * The primary focus in FY 10 was to execute the remaining unobligated ARRA funds so a considerable amount of no-year and FY 10 funds were carried over into FY 11
- * The \$36M of no year funds (prior year recoveries and supplemental) are planned for AT buys in FY 11
- * The remaining \$56M of unobligated FY 10 carryover funds are planned for the SI award expected in late June
- * FY 11 funds. Most of the equipment and SI awards (AITS, ETDs, AWT, CAT, CAD, and SSD) were not planned until the 3rd and 4th quarter of FY 11 or FY 12.




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Program Organization Chart



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Program LCCE Details

Program Life Cycle Cost Estimate -- TY\$M																		
Cost Categories	Sunk Costs (XXXX- 2010)			Point Estimate					Future Costs (2017-2029)	Life Cycle Costs								
	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016												
Planning	\$ 9.26	\$ 6.45	\$ 1.13	\$ 1.52	\$ 0.86	\$ 8.91	\$ 58.52	\$ 87.97										
Acquisition	\$ 389.90	\$ 265.25	\$ 199.29	\$ 193.58	\$ 165.74	\$ 185.56	\$ 3,751.17	\$ 5,237.62										
Operations and Maintenance	\$ 182.81	\$ 86.24	\$ 93.55	\$ 98.14	\$ 103.79	\$ 115.07	\$ 1,861.22	\$ 2,662.50										
Total	\$ 581.98	\$ 357.93	\$ 293.97	\$ 293.25	\$ 270.87	\$ 203.05	\$ 316.14	\$ 5,670.91	\$ 7,988.09									
Waiting on APMSD Cost Estimation for the 50% and 80% Confidence Level Estimates																		
										Planning								\$ -
										Acquisition								\$ -
										Operations and Maintenance								\$ -
Total	\$								\$ -									
										Planning								\$ -
										Acquisition								\$ -
										Operations and Maintenance								\$ -
Total	\$	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -									
Budget																		
										Planning								\$ -
										Acquisition								\$ -
										Operations and Maintenance								\$ -
Total	\$	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -									

- Program LCCE sunk costs year are not definite, because of varying IOC dates
- TSOs are not accounted for in the either O&M costs
- Planning equates to the sum of testing costs (let us know if you think it should be something different)



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Project LCCE Details

Program Life Cycle Cost Estimate -- TY\$M										
Cost Categories	Sunk Costs (2009-2010)				Point Estimate				Future Costs (2017-2029)	
	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	Life Cycle Costs
Planning	\$ 1.89	\$ 0.71	\$ 0.40	\$ 0.35	\$ 0.40	\$ 1.94	\$ 9.47	\$ 15.26		
Acquisition	\$ 115.72	\$ 121.33	\$ 70.13	\$ 61.26	\$ 69.49	\$ 56.85	\$ 1,166.59	\$ 1,679.01		
Operations and Maintenance	\$ 8.02	\$ 10.51	\$ 5.64	\$ 21.85	\$ 22.15	\$ 31.02	\$ 445.40	\$ 573.49		
Total	\$ 125.64	\$ 132.55	\$ 76.18	\$ 83.46	\$ 92.04	\$ 89.81	\$ 1,621.47	\$ 2,267.76		
50 % Confidence Level Estimate										
Planning										
Acquisition										
Operations and Maintenance										
Total										
Waiting on APMSD Cost Estimation for the 50% and 80% Confidence Level Estimates										
Planning										
Acquisition										
Operations and Maintenance										
Total										
Budget										
Planning										
Acquisition										
Operations and Maintenance										
Total										

- Program LCCE sunk costs year are not definite, because of varying IOC dates
- TSOs are not accounted for in the either O&M costs
- Planning equates to the sum of testing costs (let us know if you think it should be something different)



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Issues

- Vendor Development of ATR solutions

- Cause: L3 and Rapiscan are on different development schedules

- Impact: [REDACTED]

- Current Plan: Continue coordination with Rapiscan and continue testing and deploying L3 ATR solutions [REDACTED]

- Executive Assistance: Not required

- AIT Funding levels are in question for the future procurement of AIT units

- Cause: Lack of a final budget

- Impact: TSA may not be able to deploy the planned number of units in FY12

- Current Plan: Develop multiple acquisition and deployment strategies

- Executive Assistance: Not required



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Program Core Team (HPPG 8)

	Name	DHS Cert type & level	Cert Date	Current CLP Hrs
Program Management	Domenic Bianchini	PM Level III	5/15/07	80 of 80 (every 2 yrs)
	Jason Martin	PM Level III	7/16/09	80 of 80 (every 2 yrs)
	Adam Freimant	PM Level II; Level II	By 08/11; 12/11	N/A
	Talin Zarookian	PM Level I; Level II	4/10/06; by 9/30/11	80 of 80 (every 2 yrs)
	Nathan Lefebvre	PM Level II	By 9/30/11	80 of 80 (every 2 yrs)
	Chawanna Carrington	PM Level II	6/18/10	0 of 80 (every 2 yrs)
	Jennifer Orr	PM Level II	By 9/30/11	80 of 80 (every 2 yrs)
	Oscar Martin	PM Level II	2009	80 of 80 (every 2 yrs)
	Ron Shields	PM Level II; Level III	12/10; by 12/11	-
	Tony Tsantizos	PM Level I Training Complete; Level II	Pending; by 12/11	-
	Jim Stephens	PM Level I; Level II	By 09/11; 12/11	-
	Harold Hackstall	PM Level I; PM Level II	7/15/11; 10/15/11	80 of 80 (every 2 yrs)
	Jamil Nazari	PM Level I; Level II	By 09/11; 12/11	-
	Jeffrey Delaney	PM Level I; Level II	By 09/11; 12/11	-



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Program Core Team (HPPG 8)

	Name	DHS Cert type & level	Cert Date	Current CLP Hrs
Systems Engineer	Kurt Montavan	SPRDE - Systems Engineering Level III; Program Manager Level II	12/94, 5/05	80 of 80 (every 2 yrs)
	Erick Rektstad	SPRDE - Systems Engineering Level II; T&E Level II	By 12/11	80 of 80 (every 2 yrs)
	Frank Cartwright	SPRDE - Systems Engineering Level III; T&E Level III	By 12/11	80 of 80 (every 2 yrs)
	Shapna Pal	COTR; SPRDE - Systems Engineering Level II; T&E Level II	By 04/30/11; by 9/30/11; by 9/30/11	of 80 (every 2 yrs)
Acquisition/Financial Manager/Cost Analyst	Kim Rhodes			of 80 (every 2 yrs)
T&E Manager	Andy Lee			N/A
	Alan Davis	T&E Level III	4/9/10	24 of 80 (every 2 yrs)
Test & Evaluation	Mike McCormick			N/A
	Scott Rooney	T&E Level III	8/20/10	80 of 80 (every 2 yrs)
	Matt Cobey	T&E Level III	12/17/10	229 of 80 (every 2 yrs)
	Nicholas Kelmartin	COTR	12/10/10	40 of 80 (every 2 yrs)
	Mike Brown	T&E Level II	In progress	90 of 80 (every 2 yrs)
	Adam Caughran	T&E Level III	2008	80 of 80 (every 2 yrs)
	Terry Caughran	T&E Level III	2009	80 of 80 (every 2 yrs)



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Program Core Team (HPPG 8)

	Name	DHS Cert type & level	Cert Date	Current CLP Hrs
Logistics Management	George White	Life Cycle Logistics Level III	1995	80 of 80 (every 2 yrs)
	Clint Davis	Life Cycle Logistics Level III	1994	80 of 80 (every 2 yrs)
Logistician	Craig Hamilton	COTR	9/31/10	25 of 80 (every 2 yrs)
	Wendy Core	COTR; PM Level II	10/8/08, 12/13/09	68 of 80 (every 2 yrs)
	Geoff Kirby	COTR		of 80 (every 2 yrs)
	David Hobbs	PM Level II	4/16/10	80 of 80 (every 2 yrs)
	Oscar Martin	COTR; PM Level II	11/4/09	of 80 (every 2 yrs)
	Russell Smith	PM Level II; Life Cycle Logistics Level I		of 80 (every 2 yrs)



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
of Government personnel assigned: 30 PMO / 15+ Matrixed
of contractor personnel on PM staff: 10+

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Staffing Plan

Staffing Histogram



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Cross Component Coordination

- TSA has conducted outreach efforts with the following entities:
 - Customs and Border Protection
 - United States Secret Service
 - United States Treasury
 - Multiple Foreign Governments
- U.S. Secret Service is the only other DHS Component seeking similar capabilities
- TSA's AIT program milestones are not on any other DHS Component's Program Critical Path
- No other DHS program is on the program's critical path



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Open GAO Actions

Source	Title	Recommendation	Status
GAO	<i>Explosive Detection</i>	Develop a plan to ensure that screening devices or protocols are in place to resolve EDS alarms if EDSs are deployed that detect a broader set of HMEs than existing ETD machines used to resolve EDS screening alarms.	5/26/11: Report delivered to Congress
GAO	<i>Explosive Detection</i>	Develop a plan to ensure that TSA has the HME data needed for each of the planned phases of the 2010 EDS requirements before starting the procurement process for new EDSs or upgrades included in each applicable phase.	5/26/11: Report delivered to Congress
GAO	<i>Explosive Detection</i>	Establish a process to communicate information to EDS vendors in a timely manner regarding TSA's EDS acquisition, including information such as changes to the schedule. Develop and maintain an integrated master schedule for the entire Electronic Baggage Screening Program in accordance with the nine best practices identified by GAO for preparing a schedule.	5/26/11: Report delivered to Congress
GAO	<i>Explosive Detection</i>	Ensure that key elements of the program's final cost estimate reflect critical issues, such as the potential cost impacts resulting from schedule slippage identified once an integrated master schedule for the Electronic Baggage Screening Program has been developed in accordance with the nine best practices identified by GAO for preparing a schedule.	5/26/11: Report delivered to Congress



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Open GAO Actions

Source	Title	Recommendation	Status
GAO	Explosive Detection	Develop a plan to deploy EDSs that meet the most recent EDS explosives-detection requirements and ensure that new machines, as well as machines deployed in airports, will be operated at the levels established in those requirements. This plan should include the estimated costs for new machines and upgrading deployed machines, and the time frames for procuring and deploying new machines and upgrading deployed machines.	5/26/11: Report delivered to Congress



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Open IG Actions

Source	Title	Recommendation	Status
OIG	Use of American Recovery and Reinvestment Act Funds by the Transportation Security Administration for the Electronic Baggage Screening Program	Conduct further analysis of Deloitte Consulting performance under the activities covered by the contract to determine the appropriate amount allocable to the Recovery Act and adjust charges against Recovery Act funds as appropriate.	90 Day update due in June 2011
OIG	Use of American Recovery and Reinvestment Act Funds by the Transportation Security Administration for the Electronic Baggage Screening Program	Review travel costs not tested and correct any identified errors.	90 Day update due in June 2011
OIG	Use of American Recovery and Reinvestment Act Funds by the Transportation Security Administration for the Electronic Baggage Screening Program	Implement procedures to ensure that EBSP projects using Recovery Act funds are compliant with the Section 1605 Buy American requirements.	90 Day update due in June 2011



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Open IG Actions

Source	Title	Recommendation	Status
OIG	Support Services Contract	Establish evaluation factors and a review process for requirements identified in the statements of work.	No Action: Updates with OAL
OIG	Covert Testing		No Action: Updates with OAL
OIG	Covert Testing		No Action: Updates with OAL



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Open IG Actions

Source	Title	Status
OIG	Covert Testing	No Action: Updates with OAL
OIG	OSARP	(Configure all OSARP specific software to enable retention of all alarm bag images, regardless of OSARP decision made, for a period of not less than 48 hours. On 7/1/10 OIG has requested a draft procurement strategy and copies of contracts issued, if any, that reflect we now require those capabilities.
		No Action: Updates with OAL



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Open IG Actions

Source	Title	Recommendation	Status
OIG	OSARP	(Devise a means to ensure each airport utilizing EDS equipment can quickly identify which EDS machine screened a specific bag. On 7/1/10 OIG has requested a draft procurement strategy and copies of contracts issued, if any, that reflect we now require those capabilities.	No Action: Updates with OAL
OIG	Airport Passenger and Checked Baggage Screening Performance	Enhance or eliminate the current privacy filters on WBI (AITs) images to improve threat item detection capability	No Action: Updates with OAL
OIG	Airport Passenger and Checked Baggage Screening Performance	Devise and implement a quality assurance plan that enables TSA to determine the actual explosives detection status of deployed EDS	No Action: Updates with OAL



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LRIP Benefits

Moving to LRIP strategy offers TSA greater opportunity to push technology to higher tiers of detection through development and additional incentives.

Additional Benefits:

- Will have contracts in place for both regular and reduced size systems
- Offers ability to upgrade to increased functionality in both the near term and long term
- Allows for greater flexibility for future developments of AIT/ATR that coincides with TSA OSO/OST Priority List
- TSA will not be conducting "perpetual testing" for unqualified vendors against old requirements
- Provides for greater interactions between TSA and vendors earlier in process

Challenges:

- Requires new contract- have existing QPL contracts in place
- Limits abilities for new technologies to enter process
- Different process for OST procurements versus established and understood QPL process



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Pages 004723-004736 of the Administrative Record have been redacted in full from this public filing because they contain copyrighted/proprietary information. A sealed version of those documents in which Sensitive Security Information has been redacted is being filed with the Court and served on petitioner.

LODGED EX PARTE AND UNDER SEAL

TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION



Advanced Imaging Technology

★ ★ ★ ★ ★

Automated Target Recognition

July 2011

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AR 004737

Background

- In the summer of 2010, TSA issued a statement of work to qualified AIT vendors for the development and implementation of an Automated Target Recognition (ATR) solution
- In the fall of 2010, TSA completed laboratory trials of the L-3 Provision ATR and determined the detection rate to be suitable for airport trials
- February 2011 the TSA began field testing of ATR at three locations; Las Vegas, Atlanta and Washington Reagan.
- This presentation provides background on ATR functionality and insight on the testing results from airport pilots


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What is Automatic Target Recognition?

- Software that enables the AIT to automatically identify anomalies on passengers entering the security checkpoint
- Employs imaging analysis techniques to identify anomalies based on contour, pattern, and shape recognition software to uncover potential hidden weapons, explosives, and other contraband without the need for an imaging officer
- Full implementation of ATR will be based on equal or better operational effectiveness and suitability performance compared to image operators




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
How will ATR be displayed?

Operators are presented with a display that allows for the selection of male (blue) /female (pink) passenger screening




Separate ATR detection algorithms are used to reduce false alarms based on the passenger's gender

If anomalies are discovered, a screen will signify specific location(s) on the passenger where anomalies ARE detected. Image is the same regardless of gender.



If no anomalies are discovered, a screen will appear signifying that anomalies are NOT detected



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Operational Test & Evaluation (OT&E)

OT&E consisted of:

- Observations of TSOs using the AIT w/ATR to screen actual passengers
- Baseline Detection Comparison of AIT w/IO to AIT w/ATR
- Burn-in period, in which the test team reviewed data collection procedures to ensure that test team members collected the data effectively
- Demonstration of system reliability in airport environment to include operation availability and frequency of machine failure rates
- Evaluation of throughput and other operational suitability issues
- Evaluation of system safeguards for passenger privacy

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Airport OT&E

Pilot Details

Airport	Schedule	Duration of Pilot	Scope
Las Vegas International Airport (LAS)	February 01 2010 – March 15, 2010	36 days	2 L-3 AIT Systems (with and without ATR) were evaluated
Ronald Reagan National Airport (DCA)	February 05 2010 – March 19, 2010	36 days	2 L-3 AIT Systems (with and without ATR) were evaluated
Atlanta International Airport (ATL)	February 08 2010 – March 22, 2010	36 days	2 L-3 AIT Systems (with and without ATR) were evaluated

Goals

Demonstrate operational utility

Demonstrate Automated Detection

Demonstrate Reliability

Demonstrate operational effectiveness and suitability in the field environment.

Demonstrate concept of operations with automated detection capability.

Demonstrate system operation availability in airport environment.

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Operational Performance Metrics

Define criteria for operational suitability and effectiveness determination of ATR-equipped AIT units

- **Mission Performance:** Does the AIT automatically detect and display possible threats concealed on passengers?
- **Availability:** Is the AIT sufficiently available in potentially deployable environments to process passengers?
- **Human-Systems Integration (HSI):** Can available trained TSOs utilizing the AIT system at airport checkpoints successfully conduct screening operations?
- **Information Assurance:** Does the AIT prevent unauthorized system use and access to the system reporting data and imagery?
- **Interoperability:** Is the AIT interoperable with other checkpoint equipment and processes?

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Key Performance Parameters (KPPs)

KPPs are those attributes of a system that are considered critical to operational capability

KPP

Detection: Detection Rate
During TSL Testing (ORD
#33/KPP)

Detection: Detection Rate
During OT (ORD #33/KPP)

Throughput: Passengers
Screened per Hour (ORD
#34/KPP)

Operational Availability:
(AO) (ORD #22/KPP)

Safety: HSI SME Assessment of
Safety (ORD #25/KPP, #26)

Result Identified in System Evaluation Report

The L3 AIT ATR met the requirement [REDACTED]. The reliability of the system and the fact that the L3 AIT ATR did not require any scheduled preventive maintenance were key contributors to the overall AO result.

During the HSI evaluation of L3 AIT ATR operations, no apparent significant safety issues were experienced.

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Effectiveness


- The AIT ATR achieved an average hourly throughput [REDACTED] passengers per hour (pph), which is more than [REDACTED] the required throughput of 60 pph
- The system operational availability (A_0) [REDACTED] exceeded the requirement [REDACTED]
- The system Mean Time Between Critical Failures (MTBCF) [REDACTED] far exceeded the requirement [REDACTED]

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
Effectiveness



Reliability – Operational Availability

Airport	Total Test Hours	Total Downtime Hours	A ₀
ATL	558.3	13.9	
DCA	566.8	1.5	
LAS	563.5	2.9	
Overall	1688.6	18.3	

Throughput - Passengers Per Hour



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Confirmed Benefits of AIT with ATR

- Allows for reduction of manpower requirements through the elimination of the IO position
- Reduces privacy concerns, since human imagery is not reviewed by TSOs
- [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED]
- Reduces operator training requirements from days to hours
- Reduces scan time, increasing throughput from [REDACTED] passengers screened per hour
- [REDACTED]

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DHS DOT&E Summary

Letter of Assessment (LOA) findings:

- [REDACTED]
- "DOT&E concurs with the TSA findings of operationally effective and operationally suitable and finds the execution of the FOT&E adequately followed the approved Operational Test Plan."
- "All Key Performance Parameters relative to ATR implementation were satisfied as tested."
- "DOT&E must note and commend the considerable efforts and level of cooperation and collaboration observed amongst the various TSA elements, including the T&E, program management, and user communities, with respect to the ATR initiative."

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Next Steps for ATR

- Complete L3 fleet upgrade to ATR within 80 days once formal DHS approval received
- Explore additional privacy protections for imaging technology
- Test additional ATR-equipped AIT systems from vendors
- Perform additional L3 software updates (algorithm improvements)
- Continue with Rapiscan ATR testing (currently in laboratory testing for ATR qualification at TSL)
- Identify opportunities to leverage open-standards-based deployments to permit flexibility in CONOPS, allow for centralized and/or remote threat resolution, and facilitate data fusion

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Continuous Improvement of ATR

- [REDACTED]
- OST will execute a test excursion in July 2011 to test the combined effectiveness of the AIT system (ATR + Screening Operator) in detecting anomalies at the three original ATR OT&E locations: ATL, DCA and LAS
- The test excursion will gather data and focus on:
 - Detection capabilities for Tier I, Tier II and Tier III threats for the combined system (ATR + Screening Operator)
 - Secondary search rate associated with the ATR system

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Funding


- 500 units procured to date
- \$86.3M awarded for test and production units, shipping, OEM installation, and training classes
- \$7.8M awarded for ATR upgrades
- FY11 Budget \$87.5M ~ 500 units
- FY12 Budget \$48.1M ~ 275 units

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Schedule



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Deployment Approach

- Upgrade existing AIT units to ATR (July-Sept; limited to L3 initially)
- Install new ATR-equipped AIT units
 - First wave of 250 units
 - Begin deployments in August, complete by December/January
 - First deployments at airports where site preparation is complete
 - Update drawings to incorporate additional ATR units into airports with existing AIT units
 - Maintain brand consistency at hub and spoke airports for training and maintenance impacts
 - Second wave of AIT Deployments
 - Continue with deployments to airports that have already received AIT units in 2010
- Removal of WTMD required for some of the deployments in this wave


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
Deployment

ATR Deployments (August-January)



Additional AIT Deployments
(January-July)

(includes removal of WTMD with some deployment in this group)



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SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

Released Date: July 13, 2011

AUTOMATIC TARGET RECOGNITION
(ATR)

ADVANCED IMAGING TECHNOLOGY
(AIT)

STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES



Transportation
Security
Administration

SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION


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AR 004755

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
AUTOMATIC TARGET RECOGNITION
(ATR)

ADVANCED IMAGING TECHNOLOGY
(AIT)

Pages 004756-004763 of the Administrative Record have been redacted in full.

STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES

Transportation
Security
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**Transportation Security Administration
Office of Security Technology
TSA Systems Integration Facility**

**AIT Image Characterizations of Flight 253
Simulant Test Articles**

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SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

Release Date: August 25, 2011



Transportation
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SCREENING CHECKPOINT
STANDARD OPERATING
PROCEDURES

SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

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AR 004803

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Transportation Security Administration



Pages 004804-004943 of the Administrative Record have been redacted in full.

SCREENING CHECKPOINT STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES

[REDACTED]

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SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

U.S. Department of Homeland Security
Arlington, VA 20598-6016



**Transportation
Security
Administration**

SEP 30 2011

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR: John S. Pistole
Administrator

FROM: Robin Kane /s/
Assistant Administrator
Operational Process & Technology/CTO

SUBJECT: Criteria for Inclusion in Fall 2011 Risk-Based Security Pilot

Purpose

This memorandum seeks your approval of several proposed criteria for making individuals eligible for inclusion in the Fall 2011 Risk-Based Security (RBS) Pilot project. These include: U.S. citizen members of U.S. Customs and Border Protection's (CBP) Trusted Traveler Programs; age; [REDACTED] Frequent Flyer (FF) membership. Our review of some of these criteria demonstrates the tradeoffs among several potential decision points, including: estimated risk reduction; expected average daily eligible traffic at key RBS Pilot airports; and potential legal or stakeholder challenges.

This memorandum also seeks your approval for a set percentage of otherwise eligible, opted-in travelers to be randomly excluded from expedited screening on a given trip by Secure Flight; and your approval to require U.S. Government-issued identification documents at the RBS pilot screening lanes.

Background

The RBS Pilot requires TSA to identify with some confidence a population that is lower-risk, i.e., less likely to consist of unknown terrorists (UKTs) than the general population and to apply a reduced physical screening regime to that population. A full range of Watch List checking, behavioral detection, random selection to standard screening, and other random countermeasures will still be applied to this population.

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2

Key Judgments

The Office of Intelligence (OI) assessed several populations or criteria that have been proposed for the RBS Pilot: age, [REDACTED] an airline FF program, and a combination of those factors. The key judgments of those assessments¹ are summarized as follows:

- [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED]

Key Assumption

These assessments are based on the assumption that UKTs [REDACTED]

Limitations

These assessments do not guarantee, or even suggest, that there are no UKTs in any given segment of the population. Rather, the assessments only suggest that certain segments are likely to be "lower risk," i.e., likely to contain a lower number of UKTs than other segments or than the general public.

It should be noted that there are [REDACTED] other risk associated with assigning a statistically lower-risk population to "expedited screening."


¹ See SECRET presentation "Risk-Based Security Data Analysis" dated 6/22/2011, under separate cover, for detailed results.

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3



Discussion: U.S. Citizens in CBP Trusted Traveler Programs

Members of CBP Trusted Traveler Programs known as NEXUS, SENTRI, and Global Entry who are U.S. citizens are proposed for inclusion in the pilot. Total enrollment of in the programs as of July 1, 2011, is approximately the following:

- NEXUS (U.S./Canadian customs partnership): 134,000 U.S. citizens, 425,600 Canadians
- SENTRI (U.S./Mexican customs partnership): 154,800 U.S. citizens, 154,800 Mexicans
- Global Entry (U.S. Customs and Border Protection program with foreign partners): 147,400 U.S. citizens, 14,600 Foreign Nationals from Partner Countries (Canada, Netherlands, and Mexico)

To enroll in the program, and every 5 years, travelers must:

- Pay a fee
- Provide extensive biographic and biometric information to CBP and US-VISIT
- Submit to terrorism, criminal, immigration, agriculture, customs violation, and "pending investigation" background checks
- Complete a CBP officer interview of travel history
- Consent to comply with all DHS related screening protocols and random screening

We believe these travelers represent a lower risk due to the extensive background checks required for entry into the program and because CBP perpetually vets their trusted travelers against terrorist watch lists. In addition, the officer interview provides a barrier to entry that acts as both a deterrent to potential terrorist applicants and an opportunity to detect through questioning malicious intent for joining the program. Limiting the program to U.S. citizens only at the outset of the pilot also may provide some additional risk mitigation, since this would make the risk level less reliant upon foreign law enforcement infrastructure and practice. CBP will only filter U.S. citizens into the known status. Frequent Flyers will require U.S. based identity documents as an indication of U.S. citizenship. While this is not a guarantee, it places a barrier to entry for non-citizens.

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SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

4

Discussion: Frequent Flyer Status/Membership Level

[REDACTED]

it likely [REDACTED] the nature of the FF population makes a "lower-risk" population when compared to the general population. [REDACTED]

In addition, [REDACTED] FFs [REDACTED] as a base population for the RBS Pilot has significant operational and stakeholder-partnership advantages. Some of these include the airlines' ability to assist us with volume forecasts, updates on the numbers of FFs who are opting-in to this pilot, incentive for financial investments by airlines in system upgrades enabling known traveler processing, and future addition of risk-based measures by the airlines— [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

I recommend setting 1 October 2011 as the cut-off date for achieving eligible FF status for the Pilot [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

Table 1: Summary Information on American and Delta FF membership

American	Delta
[REDACTED]	

[REDACTED]

Frequent Flier status is not a protected class, nevertheless, disparate treatment of it as a population still must be rationally related to a legitimate Government interest in order to pass review under the Equal Protection Clause, were it to be challenged in court. Given the justifications outlined above for use of this status, it is likely to survive rational basis review.

[REDACTED]

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SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

6

Discussion: Age

Discussion: Random Exclusion Factor

The use of random and unpredictable measures is a key component of RBS. During the pilot period, Secure Flight will enable this capability through the use of a random exclusion factor across the various lower-risk populations. This factor will be applied automatically and will place a traveler otherwise eligible for pilot screening into baseline screening.

² This is the traffic that would be eligible for inclusion in the RBS Pilot by meeting [REDACTED] criteria. Actual participants may be fewer based on "opt-in" rates and other factors.

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SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

7

For the pilot, [REDACTED] exclusion factors can be implemented [REDACTED] within the FF populations, and one for the Global Entry members discussed in this memo. These parameters can be easily raised or lowered based on threat conditions.

Selection of the random exclusion factor involved balancing several factors. First, a current state evaluation of the random factor employed by CBP's Trusted Traveler programs provides a baseline. [REDACTED] Second, the value must be high enough to be apparent to eligible known travelers that pilot screening is not a guarantee and low enough to avoid severely degrading the anticipated operational and passenger satisfaction benefits of the pilot screening process. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] In light of other RBS measures [REDACTED] OI recommends an initial random exclusion set [REDACTED]

Table 2 below summarizes relative risk and volume levels [REDACTED], and the impact on overall volume and relative risk of the proposed exclusion factors. As seen in Table 2, [REDACTED]


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8



Separately from the age [REDACTED] OI recommends an exclusion rate [REDACTED]
U.S. citizen members of CBP's Trusted Traveler programs [REDACTED] as described
in the discussion above.

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SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

9

Recommendations:

Based upon our assessment of potential criteria for inclusion in a RBS Screening Pilot, OI recommends the following as criteria for lower-risk population:

1. Require U.S. Government-issued identification documents (e.g., passport, driver's license, etc.) for access to the RBS Pilot screening lanes as an interim measure to reduce the proportion of non-U.S citizen FFs accessing the RBS Pilot lanes.

Approve gdp 7/30/11 Disapprove _____
Modify _____ Needs more discussion _____

2. Include U.S. citizen members of CBP's Global Entry program in the RBS Pilot program

Approve gdp 7/30/11 Disapprove _____
Modify _____ Needs more discussion _____

3. Utilize _____

_____ during the pilot as a barrier to entry to minimize

Require that FFs _____

date of October 1, 2011, for inclusion in the RBS Pilot.

Approve gdp 7/30/11 Disapprove _____
Modify _____ Needs more discussion _____

4. Include in the RBS Pilot FFs who opt-in, and apply the _____
"Random Exclusion Factor"
discussion above.

Approve gdp 7/30/11 Disapprove _____
Modify _____ Needs more discussion _____

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Release Date: February 13, 2012



Transportation Security Administration

SCREENING CHECKPOINT STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES

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REDACTED SECURITY INFORMATION

Revision 1, Change 3

Release Date: February 15, 2013

Implementation Date: February 21, 2013

TSA PRE✓™

AVIATION SECURITY

RISK-BASED SECURITY (RBS)

TSA PRE✓™

STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES (SOP)

Pages 004954-005093 of the Administrative Record have been redacted in full.

Transportation
Security
Administration



The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) intends that TSA management, Transportation Security Officers, and contractors use and implement these standard operating procedures in carrying out their functions related to security screening of passengers, accessible property, and checked baggage. Nothing in these procedures is intended to create any administrative or procedural right, privilege, or benefits enforceable in any administrative, civil, or criminal matter. See *United States v. Garcia*, 440 U.S. 781 (1979).

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Revision: 1, Change 2

Release Date: February 15, 2013

Implementation Date: February 21, 2013

TSA Pre✓™ SOP

AVIATION SECURITY

RISK-BASED SECURITY (RBS)

TSA PRE✓™

STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES (SOP)



Transportation Security Administration

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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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APPENDIX 1

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
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APPENDIX I

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
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APPENDIX 2

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
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
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APPENDIX 3

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~~SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION~~

U.S. Department of Homeland Security
Office of Security Operations
601 South 12th Street
Arlington, VA 20598



Transportation
Security
Administration

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR:

John Pistole *JP* 4/16/12
Administrator, Transportation Security Administration

FROM:

Robin Kane *RK* 2/3/12
Assistant Administrator, Office of Security Capabilities

THROUGH:

Chris McLaughlin *CM* 2/3/12
Assistant Administrator, Office of Security Operations

SUBJECT:

Approval to Proceed with TSA Pre✓™ Implementation

ATTACHMENT:

Summary of TSA Pre✓™ Proof of Concept Results, Draft
Implementation Plan

Purpose

The purpose of this memo is to obtain approval to proceed with implementation of TSA Pre✓™ expedited passenger screening lanes by expanding the number of participating airlines, airports, and eligible traveler populations.

Background

A proof of concept for expediting screening for known travelers (herein referred to as TSA Pre✓™) began initial operating capability on October 4, 2011, at specific airport screening checkpoints in Atlanta, Miami, Dallas, and Detroit. The purpose of the assessment was to establish a more efficient and expedient screening process for known travelers, enabling TSA to focus time and attention on higher-risk passengers while also improving the overall travel experience. The goal of the proof of concept phase was to demonstrate scalable capabilities to enable TSA's consideration of applying expedited screening in additional airport environments.

Discussion

Between the period of October 4th and December 12, over 160,000 TSA Pre✓™ boarding passes were scanned for passengers who opted in to the expedited screening process. TSA has collected statistically significant data and demonstrated all operational capabilities as identified in the proof of

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~~SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION~~

concept plan. Preliminary Aviation Screening Assessment Program (ASAP) results reveal security effectiveness within expected parameters. The percent of travelers identified as low risk, effect on wait times, and passenger satisfaction thresholds have met or exceeded expectations. Additional feedback from our partner airlines, employees in the field, and traveling public has been highly positive. The enclosed attachments provide further detail along with a draft implementation plan.

Recommendation

We recommend expanding the implementation of TSA Pre✓™ to the nation's largest airports consistent with the enclosed plan. As part of the rollout, a cutoff date of April 1, 2012 will be assigned for achieving eligible frequent flyer status for all participating airlines.

Approve gsp 2/16/12 Disapprove _____

Modify _____ Needs More Discussion _____

Attachments: Summary of TSA Pre✓™ Proof of Concept Results
Draft Implementation Plan

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AR 005112

SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

TSA Risk-Based Security

Summary TSA Pre✓™ Proof of Concept Results

Document Last Updated February 10, 2012

The following information is in accordance with the Risk-Based Security Known Traveler Proof of Concept Plan v5.4 dated July 15, 2011.

Key Milestones, Initial Operating Capability, Airport Locations

Initial Operating Capability (IOC) began on October 4, 2010 in the following four locations:

1. Miami International Airport - MIA (Miami, FL)
2. Detroit Metro Airport - DTW (Detroit, MI)
3. Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta International Airport - ATL (Atlanta, GA)
4. Dallas Fort Worth International Airport - DFW (Dallas, TX)

Several enabling activities preceded the IOC milestone including a Risk Intel Justification Analysis, enhancements to Secure Flight prescreening, development of expedited screening standard operating procedures, airline integration testing, and delivery of TSO training. The pilot plan contains more specifics for each enabler activity.

Capabilities Demonstrated, per the Proof of Concept Plan

- ☒ Partnered with internal to DHS (CBP) and external to DHS stakeholders (airlines) to systematically identify and pre-screen low-risk passengers
- ☒ Demonstrated modified screening for identified known traveler population (i.e. reduce divesting of shoes, jackets, belts remain on, LGA and laptops remain in bags, etc)
- ☒ Demonstrated basic intelligence-driven risk engine components for dynamic passenger threat analysis using an existing capability
- ☒ Exercised random exclusion rates based on risk across the eligible population set through Secure Flight
- ☒ Observed efficiencies of modified screening of passengers deemed a lower risk, in terms of TSA staff and other elements like checkpoint footage
- ☒ Demonstrated ability to designate low risk status on the boarding pass, and
- ☒ Implemented a scalable system that allows for the expansion of lower risk passenger identification and validation.

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Exit Criteria Achieved, per the Proof of Concept Plan

Exit Criteria Which Did Occur:

- ☒ Statistically relevant amount of data captured: 162,365 TSA Pre✓™ passengers screened during checkpoint operations between October 4 and December 12, 2011.

Alternate Exit Criteria Which Did Not Occur:

If these events had happened, this would have triggered a temporary or permanent shut down of the proof of concept; none of these events happened:

- ☐ Unforeseen breach caused by the implementation of this approach
☐ Identity verification deemed insufficient to allow the privilege of low risk screening
☐ Significant negative impact to throughput of standard lanes

Performance Measures Achieved, per the Proof of Concept Plan

Measure	Description	Threshold	Objective Achieved
Percent of travelers identified as low risk	Percent of travelers with low risk status		
Effect on wait times	How long each group spends in the queue pre-TDC	Baseline	Decreased screening time
Passenger satisfaction	Passenger evaluation of the process, as calculated through exit polls	Baseline	Increase in satisfaction; captured via kiosks and call center data

Security Effectiveness Measures, per the Aviation Screening Assessment Program (ASAP)

Overall Effectiveness for RBS Pilot and Number of Tests

Classified documents provide more detail, including nationwide comparisons.



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Airport	CAT	Terminal	Air Carriers	CY 11	Qtr 1			Qtr 2			Qtr 3			Qtr 4		
					Jan 2012	Feb 2012	Mar 2012	Apr 2012	May 2012	Jun 2012	Jul 2012	Aug 2012	Sep 2012	Oct 2012	Nov 2012	Dec 2012
SFO	X	A	DL / US										DL			
	X	BC	US										US			
PHX	X	B North	AA										AA			
	X	1 (AB)	US										US			
DFW	X	E	AS										AS			
	X	C	UA											UA		
LAX		Main	AA / DL / UA / US / B6											AA / DL / UA / B6		
	X	MAIN	UA / DL / AA / AS / US											DL / AA / AS		
FLL	X	3	UA												UA	
	X	MAIN	AA / DL / B6												DL	
MCO	X	MAIN	UA / B6 / US / DL												B6	
	X	2	AA												AA	
FLL	X	2	DL												DL	
	I		UA / DL													UA / DL
ANC	X	MAIN	UA													UA
	I	South	AS													AS
B6	X	B (B)	B6													B6

Schedule Changes from RevB:
Hawaiian Launch moved to 2013 to better support carrier's technical readiness

Notes:
Ø LGA for Jet Blue in Dec dependent on volume

Air Carrier Deployments by Month

AA	LAS	LAX	IFK	ORD	DFW	DFW	LGA	STL	IND	BOS	HNL/PIT	SFO	MCO
AS					SEA	PDX	LAS	LAX	PHX	DFW	HNL	DCA	ANC
B6							BOS	MCO	FLL	LAS	ORD/PIT	SJU	LGA
DL	LAS	MSP	SLC	DCA	LAX/LGA	MCO	BOS	ORD/TPA	IND	CVG	HNL/PIT	BWI/FLL	MSY
UA/CO						ORD	BOS	LAX/LAD	IAH	LAS	EWB/PIT	SFO	DEN/MSY
US							DCA	CLT	PHX	PHL	MCO/PIT	ORD	IND

Legend:

- Tier I 0 - 10% enrollment to reach capacity neutral state
- Tier II 11 - 15% enrollment to reach capacity neutral state
- Tier III 16 - 20% enrollment to reach capacity neutral state
- Tier IV > 20% enrollment to reach capacity neutral state

- Initial PreCheck Deployment
- Expansion at same Checkpoint
- Expansion at additional Terminal/Checkpoint

* Airlines designated with yellow color coding, can be implemented pending air carrier and FSD readiness and coordination with TSA Headquarters

PreCheck Schedule Criteria:

- 1) 100% CAT-X Coverage (minimum of 1-Lane) by end of CY12
- 2) Capacity Neutral
- 3) Airline Preference
- 4) Cost Neutral
- 5) Common Concourse

Risks:

- 1) Common concourses with multiple participating PreCheck air carriers service the same checkpoint. As a result some locations may not reach their capacity neutral/cost neutral state until all participating carriers are deployed at the common concourse.
- 2) Proximity of additional carriers' ticket counter to existing/planned TPC checkpoint
- 3) Increases to the "LULL" Passenger base population is required to achieve cost neutral state at a majority of the sites.
- 4) Carriers ability to meet programming requirements for multiple sites on schedule.

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AR 005115

TSA PreCheck Deployment Plan CY12 Rev9

Version Date: 2 Feb 12

Airport	CAT	Terminal	Air Carrier	CY 11	Qtr 1			Qtr 2			Qtr 3			Qtr 4		
					Jan 2012	Feb 2012	Mar 2012	Apr 2012	May 2012	Jun 2012	Jul 2012	Aug 2012	Sept 2012	Oct 2012	Nov 2012	Dec 2012
MDA	X	Main	DL / AA / US / UA / AS	AA												
	X	C	AA	AA												
	X		DL / UA / AA / US	AA												
	X	North (D)	AA	AA												
	X	1 (D)	AA / DL / UA / AS / B6	DL / AA					AS				B6 / UA			
	X	4	AA		AA											
	X	Lindbergh	DL / UA / AA / US / AS		DL											
	X	8	AA			AA										
	I	2	DL			DL										
	X	3	AA / B6				AA							B6		
LGA	X	5	DL / AS				DL								AS	
	X	Q (East/West)	DL					DL								
	X	WEST	AS / HA					AS								
	X	D	AA					AA								
	X	S	DL					DL								
PDX	X	East	DL						DL							
	I	Main	AS / AA / US						AS							
	X	2	UA / DL / US						UA		DL				US	
	X	A	AA						AA							
	X	S	B6						B6							
	X	C	B6 / UA							B6 / UA						
BOS	X	B (D)	AA							AA						
	X	A	DL							DL						
DTA	X	N	US							US						
	X	MAIN	US / AA / DL / UA / B6								US					
	X	MAIN	AA / DL / UA / US								AA					
	X	MAIN	UA								UA					
LAX	I	Main E	DL / UA								DL					
	X	6	UA / AS								UA / AS					
	X	West	AA / UA / US / B6								B6			US		AA
	X	C	UA									UA				
	I	MAIN	DL / UA / US / AA									DL / AA				US
	X	4	US									US				
	X	3	B6									B6				
	X	2	AS										AS			


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DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

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Cover Sheet




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Reference: 49 CFR § 1520.13, Marking SSI

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Release Date: July 9, 2012



Transportation Security Administration

Pages 005120-005203 of the Administrative Record have been redacted in full

SCREENING CHECKPOINT STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES

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
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Pages 005120-005263 of the Administrative Record have been redacted in full.

SCREENING CHECKPOINT
STANDARD OPERATING
PROCEDURES



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SECURITY SENSITIVE INFORMATION

U.S. Department of Homeland Security
701 S. 12th St
Arlington, VA 20598



**Transportation
Security
Administration**

JAN 21 2013

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR:

John S. Pistole
Administrator

THROUGH:

J.W. Halinski
Deputy Administrator

David Nicholson
Assistant Administrator, Finance and Administration

Christopher McLaughlin
Assistant Administrator, Security Operations

FROM:

John Sanders
Assistant Administrator, Security Capabilities

SUBJECT:

Removal of Advanced Imaging Technology Systems (AIT)
without Automated Target Recognition (ATR) in
compliance with Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)
Modernization and Reform Act

Background

Following the December 25, 2009 attempted attack on Northwest Flight 253, TSA aggressively pursued immediate countermeasures to address the threat of non-metallic explosives and other dangerous materials concealed on a person. Beginning in 2010, 250 Rapiscan units were purchased to begin to close this vulnerability, along with other adjustments to screening protocols and procedures, consistent with safety, privacy, and civil liberties concerns. Rapiscan units were the first deployed and thus were generally installed at the largest, high passenger volume airports.

We expected that the AIT detection capabilities of the original units would continue to improve; automatic target recognition (ATR) capability would soon be introduced; and performance requirements would be met to improve operational and cost efficiency. We deemed the original capability acceptable in light of the urgent and continuing threat, and deliberate progress to

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advance performance of the AIT equipment was expected. While progress was not as quick as expected, L3 (which makes millimeter wave AIT machines) has generally met our expectations and continues to make progress. Rapiscan has struggled in several areas including obtaining approval for its ATR solution.

The FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012 (FAA Act) directs "the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) Administrator to ensure that advanced imaging technology used for the screening of passengers is equipped with automatic target recognition software (which would produce a generic image of the individual being screened) beginning on...June 1, 2012" (p. 253). This Act also allowed you to grant an extension, which you issued for one year, ending May 31, 2013. The extension was based on the expectation that Rapiscan's ATR solution would pass testing and be ready for deployment in October 2012. Unfortunately, Rapiscan did not meet that deadline.

During November and December, TSA engaged in detailed discussions with Rapiscan which resulted in a negotiated settlement that terminates purchase orders for additional AIT units and our order for ATR for the convenience of the Government. As part of the termination agreement Rapiscan, among other concessions, will remove, store, and redeploy all of the units TSA purchased from Rapiscan as directed to other mission priorities within the Government. Rapiscan will pay all costs associated with removal, shipping, storage, redeployment, and any disposal costs. If another purpose/use for the machines is identified, the costs associated with redeployment to another agency or perhaps another country will be at no cost to TSA.

Absent you granting an additional waiver, the FAA Act prevents operation of AIT without ATR beyond June 1, 2013, and is based on privacy concerns raised by Congress. With the termination of the Rapiscan orders, we need to determine the disposition of the units that is most advantageous to the Government. Of the 250 Rapiscan AIT that TSA owns, 174 are installed and operational at checkpoints around the country. The remaining 76 Rapiscan units are stored in the TSA Logistics Center in Texas as a result of the redeployment effort that began in 2012¹. Available L3 AIT units or other procedural changes are available to maintain or enhance the security effectiveness of TSA screening.

We have been following a redeployment plan that moves L3 AIT units, which are ATR capable and have a significantly higher throughput than Rapiscan units without ATR, to airports where we have the highest volume passenger traffic, and shifts Rapiscan units to lower volume locations. This redeployment plan was intended to improve security effectiveness and overall efficiency, as well as increase the overall AIT utilization rate across the system. The redeployment of Rapiscan units began at a time when we anticipated Rapiscan would pass testing for its ATR solution in October of 2012.

It is important to remember that AIT units were needed as an immediate countermeasure for non-metallic explosive devices, and met initial performance expectations for security value when initially deployed across the nation. The purchase price of the 250 Rapiscan AIT units was \$40 million, and over 130 million people have been screened by those units. This equates to a capital

¹ OSC-12-117, *Redeployment of Rapiscan AIT from Seven CAT X Airports*, May 14, 2012

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~~SECURITY SENSITIVE INFORMATION~~

investment for screening a passenger for metallic and non-metallic objects with a Rapiscan AIT of about 31 cents per person.

From the original acquisition planning and determination of the number of units required for screening, several things have changed. Most notably, TSA adopted a Risk-Based Security (RBS) philosophy for passenger screening, and implemented several RBS initiatives to provide expedited screening for an increasing number of passengers. These initiatives include intelligence and information based pre-screening that limit the need for physical screening using technology such as AIT. The successful implementation and expansion of several RBS programs over the past year, and projected for the coming year, supports adjusting the acquisition and deployment plan to reflect a smaller number of AIT units compared with the original plan from 2010.

Including the 250 Rapiscan now in our inventory or operation, TSA has acquisition and operational funding for a total of 1,250 AIT units. Of that number, 250 units have not been purchased. Additional AIT units will only be purchased if they have passed testing for enhanced detection capability and ATR capability.

We do not intend to use AIT units in TSA Pre✓™ and expedited screening lanes at this time. Further, we identified lanes where we have AIT machines with very low utilization, and reassessed the current need for AIT at the smallest (Category IV and IIR) airports.

This reduced need means that we can remove the 250 Rapiscan units from our inventory and backfill those units with a smaller number of better performing ATR-capable AIT units and realize savings relative to the currently funded project plan.

While we anticipate overall savings from the AIT project perspective, enabling the increase in expedited screening is expected to involve some investments and adjustments in areas such as information program architecture and real time threat assessment capabilities, such as canine teams and behavior detection and analysis. This is consistent with our experience in airports and early results of managed inclusion pilots.

Summary

The Rapiscan AIT units were important to closing the on-body vulnerability associated with a non-metallic threat. The units performed as originally required and safely screened millions of passengers, but failed to meet ATR and system maturity requirements. Our contractual commitment with Rapiscan for purchase and installation of AIT is terminated. The FAA Act prohibits us from operating AIT without ATR capability past May of this year. Applying a risk-

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based approach to the deployment of AIT with ATR, coupled with RBS initiatives such as modified screening procedures for children under 12 and adults over 75, TSA Pre✓™, and managed inclusion, allows us to retire the Rapiscan AIT, reduce the total number of AIT units needed, and substitute these RBS methods to improve security effectiveness and efficiency.

Other agencies may have security demands and operational requirements that make Rapiscan AIT a useful tool for them and we are exploring those opportunities. While savings in the AIT program area will be realized, more work is needed to estimate enabling investments in RBS initiatives.

Recommendation

Remove Rapiscan AIT from operations by a goal of May 31, 2013 and improve operational effectiveness and efficiency of deployed units by:

- Reallocating the L3 AIT units not yet installed. [REDACTED]
- Reallocating the L3 AIT units currently in TSA Pre✓™ lanes. Many of these AIT units will be backfilled with [REDACTED]
- Reallocating the L3 AIT units currently deployed to CAT III and IV airports. [REDACTED]
- Reallocating L3 AIT units in lanes that are currently open less than [REDACTED] of total checkpoint hours (measured on average week of peak month). This right-sizing effort does not set a policy but allows us to ensure all vulnerabilities are covered and an interim FOC is defined to inform future policy decisions.
- Pursue opportunities for use by other agencies, where Rapiscan AIT may meet their security requirements.
- Continue to evaluate pilot/proof-of-concept programs and potential net savings from the combined RBS initiatives.

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Separate from the removal of Rapiscan AIT units, it is important to continue collaboration with DHS Directorate of Science and Technology and the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) on the recently announced NAS study on the safety of backscatter technology.

Approve JD / 1/18/13
Date

Disapprove _____ / _____
Date

Modify _____ / _____
Date

Needs more discussion _____ / _____
Date

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U.S. Department of Homeland Security
601 South 12th Street
Arlington, VA 20398



Transportation
Security
Administration

DEC 14 2012

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR:

John S. Pistole
Administrator

THROUGH:

J.W. Halinski
Deputy Administrator

John Sanders /s/
Assistant Administrator
Office of Security Capabilities

Chris McLaughlin /s/
Assistant Administrator
Office of Security Operations

FROM:

Douglas Hofsass /s/
Assistant Administrator
Office of Risk Based Security

SUBJECT:

Managed Inclusion Proof of Concept Underway

Purpose

The purpose of this memo is to provide an update on the activities associated with testing a Managed Inclusion (MI) proof of concept to manage risk while increasing passenger volume in TSA Pre✓™ lanes.

Background

By the end of calendar year 2012, 35 of the Nation's largest airports will have TSA Pre✓™ expedited screening lanes. For those airports experiencing low passenger volumes in the expedited lane, new methods are needed to manage security risk while also increasing traffic in the lane in an effort to optimize efficiency.

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Discussion

The concept of operations for MI is for TSA to identify passengers for TSA Pre✓™ expedited screening based on real-time threat assessment via canine and behavior detection. Passengers are selected for inclusion by a random generator, or based on easily identifiable low-risk criteria, such as age (appearing under 12 or over 75) and U.S. military in uniform. By testing on a small scale, we are learning the viability and potential applicability to other airport checkpoint environments. A secondary goal of the proof of concept is to demonstrate the TSA Pre✓™ process to general travelers and motivate them and the airlines to more fully participate in the program.

The Office of Security Capabilities (OSC) is supporting the Office of Security Operations (OSO) in this effort. Given the existing risk assessments already conducted on each aspect of the MI solution (canine, behavior detection, random generators, etc.), no additional risk assessment was required to launch this proof of concept. Additional specifics, including staffing and conceptual design, appear in the enclosed slide deck.

OSO chose Indianapolis International Airport (IND) as the initial test site based on several factors, including accessibility and availability of a Passenger Screening Canine (PSC) Team. The screening layout for Checkpoint A has a single point of entry; passenger flow is controllable and easily monitored to ensure the PSC Team screens all passengers. Additionally, IND is one of two airports that currently have a PSC Team operating in front of the screening checkpoint and a TSA Pre✓™ lane. Tampa International Airport (TPA) is the second site in the proof of concept. The "E" Airside Checkpoint was easily adapted to accommodate Risk-Based Security-MI, also having a TSA Pre✓™ lane and PSC Teams.

The proof of concept will use existing staffing levels, using a Playbook Behavior Detection Officer (BDO) to supplement the team while the proof of concept is in operation. In the expedited screening lane, screening procedures and random exclusion rates will remain the same as TSA Pre✓™ lanes throughout the country.

The data collection for this proof of concept catalogued baseline (without MI) and record (with MI) observations, including the number of individuals selected for expedited screening, impact to standard lane wait time when the concept is activated, the count of BDO assignments to standard screening, canine response rates (alarms), and other factors.

Baseline data collection occurred at IND during four 2-hour periods from October 15-25, 2012. After the MI proof of concept burn-in starting November 1, the record data collection consisted of four similar (same days and hours as baseline) periods from November 8-19, 2012. The TPA baseline also occurred during four 2-hour periods from November 11-15, 2012, followed by a week-long MI proof of concept burn-in and eight 2-hour periods for record collection from November 25 through December 6, 2012. The Office of Public Affairs and Strategic Communications conducted a low-key, local media announcement to support this effort.

OSC is compiling data from both sites. By December 31, 2012, we will provide a summary of the findings and recommendations for follow-on actions.

Enclosure

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MANAGED INCLUSION (IND) PROOF OF CONCEPT INFORMATION SLIDES

December 2012




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SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION



Airport Staffing

- PSC Team: Staffed per PSC SOP

Extra Staff for MI

- Customer Service Representative (CSR)
 - IND used a TSO; TPA has Contract Security
- Communications Officer (Divestiture Officer)
 - Helps MI pax unfamiliar with Pre✓™
- IND used Playbook-assigned BDO
- TPA BDOs are on rotation

Extra Staff for MI

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Equipment Needs

- Randomizer
 - A pressure-sensitive mat, when stepped upon, displays on a free-standing panel, an arrow, pointing right or left randomly
 - The rate of right- or left- selection is easily adjusted based on need (i.e., a setting of 80 produces an 80% - 20% chance of getting a right arrow)
 - Power supply is A/C; However, TSIF provided UPS for TPA for battery operation, no A/C plugs at Checkpoint queue
- Solid glass stanchions
 - Prevent breach into TSA Pre✓™ or MI lane.
- Signs advising passengers of a field assessment

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Process Overview

- All pax walk past the PSC Team to enter Screening Checkpoint
- [REDACTED]
- Individuals queue per CSR guidance
 - Dependent on line levels
 - Dependent on risk level
- Selectee markings, BDO assessment, PSC alarms supersede MI into TSA Pre✓™
- BDOs and PSC Team resolve behaviors/alarms according to applicable SOPs

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Process Overview Cont'd

- Randomizer positioned next to Travel Document Checker (TDC) nearest the Pre✓™ lane
- TDC follows TDC SOP to verify boarding pass and ID
- Selectees referred per the TDC SOP
- Pax in queue step on mat during ID check
 - IND - Only pax in short queue
 - TPA - Queue leads to 2 TDCs; Only one TDC station has mat

[REDACTED] may allow flight crewmembers in uniform, individuals with Congressional or Spouse ID, U.S. military in uniform, families with children 12 and under, and adults 75 and older into MI Lane without Randomizer result

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
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AR 005275

SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

Managed Inclusion Conceptual Design


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U.S. Department of Homeland
Security
Office of Security Operations
601 South 12th Street
Arlington, VA 20598

JAN 18 2013



Transportation
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ACTION


MEMORANDUM FOR:

John S. Pistole
Administrator, Transportation Security Administration

THROUGH:

John W. Halinski
Deputy Administrator

FROM:

Chris McLaughlin 
Assistant Administrator, Security Operations

Douglas Hofsass 
Assistant Administrator, Risk Based Security

John Sanders 
Assistant Administrator, Security Capabilities

SUBJECT:

Approval to Adjust Managed Inclusion Procedures For
Continued Field Assessment

Purpose

This memorandum seeks approval to make two adjustments in the Managed Inclusion (MI) proof of concept for continued assessment. These proposals are intended to improve operations and resource efficiency while keeping security at or above the same level as standard screening.

The first adjustment amends the current MI  reporting threshold used in daily Screening of Passengers with Observation Techniques (SPOT) screening operations. The second amends the application of random screening from a physical random generator mat to a random application process when real time threat assessment capabilities are in place¹. These procedural modifications will impact future MI assessment.

¹ Real time threat assessment in this memorandum applies to Passenger Screening Canine teams and Behavior Detection Officers operating with a high p(e).

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locations as well as the current assessment sites in Indianapolis International Airport (IND) and Tampa International Airport (TPA).

Background

In October 2012, Managed Inclusion (MI) was developed to increase the passenger volume of the Pre✓™ screening lane through a risk-based process that efficiently, securely, and randomly routed passengers from standard screening to Pre✓™ screening. In November 2012, the proof-of-concept (PoC) rolled out in IND and TPA, using real-time threat assessment capabilities (PSC teams and BDOs) and an electronic randomization mat to ensure that it was operationally feasible to process some standard passengers into the Pre✓™ lane.

The electronic randomization mat was set to generate unpredictability with regard to possible inclusion and, thus, reduce the potential risk of an adversary being able to game the system and be included into the Pre✓™ lane. The mat was also used to make the random application of inclusion transparent to the traveling public to reduce the appearance and possibility of profiling.

Additionally, a [REDACTED] SPOT threshold was established for MI candidates such that any passenger who met [REDACTED] SPOT points was not eligible for expedited screening and was directed to the standard screening lane.²

Discussion

1. Replace the physical random generator mat with a randomizing process that is more efficient, cost-effective, and logistically feasible at multiple locations.

A floor mat that randomly includes passengers (at a [REDACTED]) into TSA Pre✓™ is a risk mitigation measure that was used in the original MI designs. This randomized element was included as a layer of unpredictability to prevent an adversary from gaming the system during initial phases of pilot testing and as a measure to make our random selection transparent.

When passengers step on the random generator mat, they are generally unaware they are selected for expedited screening versus standard screening, only that they are directed to one lane over the other. Besides the operational burden of staffing and cost of adding the mat to the screening checkpoint footprint, it reduces the number of passengers that can be directed to the MI lane. For example, a passenger in a wheelchair is unable to step on the mat to be eligible for TSA Pre✓™ screening.

A passenger is excluded from the MI process if he or she is a Selectee [REDACTED] displays [REDACTED] SPOT indicators, or the random generator mat directs him/her to the standard lane. A process whereby the following criteria are met will provide a

² SPOT Referral procedures are also still in place such that [REDACTED] then he/she is referred for additional screening per the current procedures.

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level of randomness without the need of a physical mat and ensures local application of the process does not include arbitrary selection for inclusion or exclusion.

- Depending on how many lanes and entry points lead to a checkpoint queue, only select lanes can be opened to MI processing while others flow directly to standard screening. The passenger's act of selecting an entry point and queue adds to the randomness, because they will not know if they are in the MI or the standard queue.
- A "designated marker" that indicates the MI lane is full, so the process must halt until the line clears: The MI queue leading to TSA Pre✓™ screening has a start and end point, designated by stanchions. The Officer directing individuals into either the MI queue or the standard queue will have a physical marker (third stanchion, stanchion with the MI sign on it, etc.) to use as the end point. When there is room for more passengers in the queue, the Officer directs individuals there, and when it is full, or the next passenger is ineligible for MI, the Officer directs the passenger to the standard lane. In this process, if a passenger asks why he or she was directed to another lane, the Officer can explain that the line is full (per the marker), [REDACTED], or the passenger was selected for additional screening.

2. Apply the [REDACTED] SPOT threshold to exclude an individual from the MI process.

During the initial phases of the MI at IND and TPA, [REDACTED] threshold was established to ensure that any passengers who displayed [REDACTED] SPOT points would be removed from MI eligibility and sent to the standard screening lane. The threshold was set at [REDACTED] based upon an assessment comparing relative increase in security gained through a lower threshold to the operational impact of additional false alarms and, initially, it was determined that a [REDACTED] threshold would identify a greater number of passengers exhibiting suspicious behaviors than the [REDACTED] threshold used in daily SPOT screening operations. Although a decreased threshold increases false alarm rate, the passenger experience impact would be mitigated since the passengers that meet this threshold would be routed to standard screening. The estimation of both the security gains (i.e. additional passengers excluded) and passenger impacts (i.e. additional false alarms) was informed by the insights gained from the BDO Validation Study³ completed by U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Science and Technology Directorate (S&T) in 2011. Thus, this security gain due to the lower threshold made the [REDACTED] exclusion a good option to start with during the early stages of the proof-of-concept.

After weeks of operating MI at IND and TPA, initial feedback and insight suggest adjusting the current [REDACTED] threshold to the [REDACTED] threshold used in daily SPOT screening operations.

³ This Study indicated that an additional [REDACTED] that had High-Risk Outcomes (i.e. true positives) would be selected at a SPOT score of [REDACTED] or more while only an additional [REDACTED] more cleared passengers (i.e. false alarms) would be selected at this SPOT score. See full BDO Validation Study for complete details.

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As depicted in Diagram 1, the original design uses multiple security countermeasures (BDOs, PSC teams, and a randomized mat) that are intended to compensate for the reduced physical screening that Managed Inclusion passengers receive if they undergo Pre✓™ screening instead of standard screening.

With so much mitigation already present, from the PSC teams with high p(d) and 100 percent p(e)⁴ to the BDOs at very high p(e),

- The higher probability of referral (p(r)) resulting from the lower BDO exclusion threshold is not required to meet current security effectiveness. Thus, we recommend the BDO exclusion threshold be removed from the current MI procedures at IND and TPA. The threshold for SPOT referral will remain in effect for all passengers and become the exclusion threshold for MI. This change would allow TSA to better attain the operational benefits of MI and it may reduce the cognitive burden on BDOs without significantly impacting the security effectiveness of the MI procedures.
- The additional aspect of unpredictability provided by the randomized mat is no longer required to meet current security effectiveness. Therefore, an alternative random process can be implemented to reduce the appearance and possibility of profiling.

Configuration	Pre-Screening	Real-Time	Physical Screening	Total
Standard Lane				
TSA Pre✓™ Lane				
Proposed Adjusted Managed Inclusion				
Original Managed Inclusion				

⁴ This refers to the p(e), or probability of encounter, for Managed Inclusion passengers.

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SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

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Recommendations

Based upon our assessment of the security impact and transparency of these procedural adjustments to the MI procedures at IND and TPA, we recommend that:

1. The random application to the MI process not be reliant on a physical random generator mat when real-time threat assessment and a random application process can accomplish the same goal of security effectiveness and transparency.

Approve _____ \ _____ Disapprove _____ \ _____
Date Date Date

Modify _____ \ _____ Needs more discussion _____ \ _____
Date Date Date

2. The [REDACTED] threshold for SPOT referral become the exclusion threshold for MI.

Approve _____ \ _____ Disapprove _____ \ _____
Date Date Date

Modify _____ \ _____ Needs more discussion _____ \ _____
Date Date Date

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Recommendations

Based upon our assessment of the security impact and transparency of these procedures, we recommend that the MI procedures at BND and TPA be recommended that:

1. The random application to the MI process not be reliant on a physical random generator that when real-time threat assessment and a random application process can be established the same goal of security effectiveness and transparency.

At issue: _____
Date: _____
Disapprove: _____

Needs more discussion: _____
Date: _____

1. The threshold for SPOT internal become the exclusive threshold for MI.

At issue: _____
Date: _____
Disapprove: _____

Needs more discussion: _____

Pages 005283-005362 of the Administrative Record have been redacted in full from this public filing because they contain copyrighted/proprietary information. A sealed version of those documents in which Sensitive Security Information has been redacted is being filed with the Court and served on petitioner.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on June 19, 2013, I filed the public, redacted version of the "Administrative Record - Sensitive Security Information Materials (Volumes 4A-4D)" with the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit by FedEx. I also certify that, on the same day, I served one copy of each of these public, redacted volumes on petitioner, listed below, by FedEx:

Jonathan Corbett
382 NE 191st St. #86952
Miami, FL 33179

s/Sharon Swingle
SHARON SWINGLE

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

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